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"Make Sure DSA Signing Exponentiations Really are Constant-Time"
2016
Proceedings of the 2016 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security - CCS'16
TLS and SSH are two of the most commonly used protocols for securing Internet traffic. Many of the implementations of these protocols rely on the cryptographic primitives provided in the OpenSSL library. In this work we disclose a vulnerability in OpenSSL, affecting all versions and forks (e.g. LibreSSL and BoringSSL) since roughly October 2005, which renders the implementation of the DSA signature scheme vulnerable to cache-based side-channel attacks. Exploiting the software defect, we
doi:10.1145/2976749.2978420
dblp:conf/ccs/GarciaBY16
fatcat:z4vavxoz7rel5grkwdvlrgkau4