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The Pragmatic Gettier: Brandom on Knowledge and Belief [El Gettier pragmático: Brandom sobre conocimiento y creencia]
2019
Zenodo
Knowledge and belief fully display the pragmatic features that make of them different concepts only in third-person epistemic attributions. This is the main thesis of this paper, which has three sections. In section 1 I argue, following a pragmatic reading of Gettier, that agents on their own lights cannot tell the difference between what they know and what they believe that they know. The reason lies on the pragmatic peculiarities of normative notions, which according to Brandom's normative
doi:10.5281/zenodo.2652385
fatcat:dm7xj42tgjgxfdvjgvqi2gvlo4