Williamson on Gettier Cases in Epistemic Logic and the Knowledge Norm for Rational Belief: A Reply to a Reply to a Reply

Stewart Cohen, Juan Comesaña
2013 Inquiry (Oslo)  
In our reply to Williamson, we offered models where traditional Gettier cases arise but which differ from Williamson's models in three related respects: first, non-traditional, fake-barn style Gettier cases do not arise in our models; second, knowledge iterates in our models; and, finally, our models do not have the Moorish consequences of Williamson's models. 1 Predictably, Williamson thinks that our models have no value whatsoever. Our reasons for preferring them 'evaporate', he says, and
more » ... ', he says, and they have 'epistemologically absurd consequences'. We think that Williamson exaggerates. We first address the allegedly absurd consequences our models have. These are based on the fact that they allow for what Williamson calls 'cliff-edge knowledge': 'Say that one has cliff-edge knowledge of the real value of the parameter when it is in fact e if and only if one either knows that it is at least e
doi:10.1080/0020174x.2013.816087 fatcat:etkowzclana7rhnw46pc3zk2my