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In this paper, we propose a canonical prune-and-SAT (CP SAT) attack for breaking state-of-the-art routing-based obfuscation techniques. In the CP SAT attack, we first encode the key-programmable routing blocks (keyRBs) based on an efficient SAT encoding mechanism suited for detailed routing constraints, and then efficiently re-encode and reduce the CNF corresponded to the keyRB using a bounded variable addition (BVA) algorithm. In the CP SAT attack, this is done before subjecting the circuit toarXiv:2009.02206v1 fatcat:lulv4w35lbgfdjb723aqv4mdom