Introduction The literature on political trust has long emphasised its relevance for democracy and democratic consolidation. All types of trust indeed have been considered as indispensable to the sustainability of a democratic system, given that it supplies democratic or democratising polities with the necessary social and political capital to either remain stable or consolidate democracy. This chapter moves on from these assumptions to review the extant literature on political trust in

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... arian settings, a relatively understudied field. It is contended here that the main contribution of this literature to broader studies of political trust has been the questioning of the inherent connection between political trust and democracy, which implies that political trust cannot exist or is in very low supply in authoritarian settings. In fact, examinations of authoritarianism have demonstrated that the larger political context, regardless of its nature, can generate a specific type of political trust. The literature on political trust is largely concerned with two sets of questions. First, what are the causes or origins of political trust and second what are its consequences. These two broad questions have been largely applied to the study of democratic settings, but they are important for authoritarian countries, as well where a different kind of political trust might develop and whose function is to strengthen authoritarianism. In this respect we advance the idea that, much like the concept of civil society (Berman 2003; Encarnacion 2006) , political trust should be stripped of its implicit normative character. This normativity is the product of the near absence of studies engaging with political trust as a neutral concept in so far as it is often limited to discussions as to how authoritarian settings could transit towards liberal democracy through the production of trust (Almond and Verba 1963; Epstein 1984; Putnam 1993 and Diamond 1999; Edwards, Foley and Diani 2001). The contention here is that implied normativity of the concept of trust obscures the potential similarities that exist between established democracies and authoritarian settings in the production of political trust. While the latter is believed to be desirable per se, an aspect that emerges from the studies of trust and social capital in authoritarian contexts is the double-edge sword political trust can be. Thus, just as it can serve the purpose of democratisation or strengthening democracy, it can also be employed and become functional to the survival of authoritarian rule. The chapter begins with a discussion on the roots of political trust in authoritarian settings as framed in the debate between culturalism and institutionalism. We then look at the consequences of political trust in authoritarian settings. In the second part of the chapter we highlight the contributions and significance of this field of study to the wider literature on political trust, highlighting in particular the seemingly paradox of authoritarian systems displaying quite high levels of political trust. The concluding part of the chapter presents findings from three case-studies -China, Iran and Moroccowhere we tease out some of the definitional and theoretical complexity through an analysis of how in practice political trust works in authoritarian systems. Roots of political trust in authoritarian settings: Culturalism and institutionalism The first question as to what is the origin of political trust in established democracies is built around the 'culturalist' versus the 'institutionalist' debate (Mishler and Rose 2001) and finds a parallel when it comes to analyse authoritarian settings. In this respect there are works attempting to explain the absence of political trust through cultural variables and offer a 'cultural' revolution as the solution to generate it, implying therefore that this constitutes the basis for democratisation. Thus, we have for example links to a specific and often partisan interpretation of religious precepts as an obstacle to the creation of genuine political trust. This is the case of studies looking at the role of Islam in both society and politics, which make the argument that democracy and Islam are incompatible and that therefore 'trust' is not an element that is required to govern in part because the legitimation to rule does not derive from the people (Pipes 2003; Voll 2007) . It would be however mistaken to focus simply on Islam, as other religions have served as the variable explaining the absence of political trust and, by implication, democracy. Confucianism, for instance, has been employed to explain the high level of confidence in state institutions in the case of South East Asia irrespective of the authoritarian nature of regimes, because Confucian tradition is seemingly supportive of the values of hierarchy and deference to authority (Fukuyama 1995). In a similar vein Catholicism and its authoritarian hierarchical nature were put forth as explanations for the prevalence of authoritarian regimes in Southern Europe first and Latin America later in the 1970s and 1980s (Wiarda 1981). Other culturalist factors beyond religion that have been employed to explain the absence of political trust in authoritarian countries are tribalism and clanism. These factors seemingly characterise Arab countries, but they are also popular when accounting for the absence of both democracy and/or political trust in sub-Saharan Africa (Hodgekin 1956; Coleman 1958 and 1994) , post-communist Central Asia or specific territories of Western Europe, like in the case of Banfield's 'amoral familism' argument applied to Southern Italy (1967). Kinship, clanism and tribalism are often connected to the persistence of a pre-modern era, where un-modern cultural values dominate, and are often referred to as an obstacle to the formation of modern-minded social capital and trust that would lead to cultural modernity and democracy (Rudolph and Rudolph 1967; O'Donnell 1996; Lauth 2000) . These culturalist explanations are challenged by institutionalism, which examines the potential for both democratisation and growth of political trust in authoritarian societies. In a sense culturalist explanations find it difficult to come to terms with political change and have a difficult time accounting for it when this occurs, because culturalism is by its very nature seemingly unchangeable. Thus, institutionalists argue that once the institutionspolitical, economic or socialof a specific setting are modified, attitudes of ordinary citizens will change as well, leading to profound transformations. In this respect political trust not only can be created, but also sustained, particularly if one takes into account the positive spin-offs that transitions to democracy usually generate. This is for instance what Weatherford (1992) contends, as he sees support for institutions as deriving from institutional features such as