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An incentive compatible reputation mechanism
2003
Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '03
Traditional centralised approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed marketplaces in which software agents operate. Developing a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents can provide a softer notion of security that is sufficient for many multi-agent applications. In this paper, we address the issue of incentivecompatibility (i.e. how to make it optimal for agents to share reputation information truthfully), by introducing a sidepayment scheme, organised
doi:10.1145/860575.860778
dblp:conf/atal/JurcaF03
fatcat:pimsury2kvgpfclhnfmex3tuwu