An incentive compatible reputation mechanism

Radu Jurca, Boi Faltings
2003 Proceedings of the second international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '03  
Traditional centralised approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed marketplaces in which software agents operate. Developing a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents can provide a softer notion of security that is sufficient for many multi-agent applications. In this paper, we address the issue of incentivecompatibility (i.e. how to make it optimal for agents to share reputation information truthfully), by introducing a sidepayment scheme, organised
more » ... rough a set of broker agents, that makes it rational for software agents to truthfully share the reputation information they have acquired in their past experience. We also show how to use a cryptographic mechanism to protect the integrity of reputation information and to achieve a tight bounding between the identity and reputation of an agent.
doi:10.1145/860575.860778 dblp:conf/atal/JurcaF03 fatcat:pimsury2kvgpfclhnfmex3tuwu