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The HMQV protocols are 'hashed variants' of the MQV key agreement protocols. They were recently introduced by Krawczyk, who claimed that the HMQV protocols have very significant advantages over their MQV counterparts: (i) security proofs under reasonable assumptions in the (extended) Canetti-Krawczyk model for key exchange; and (ii) superior performance in some situations. In this paper we demonstrate that the HMQV protocols are insecure by presenting realistic attacks in the Canetti-Krawczykdoi:10.1515/jmc.2007.004 fatcat:xhpausnl5zanvoigdce7rxwcfe