Formalizing and Verifying Generations of AKA Protocols

Angela Rellstab, Ralf Sasse, David Basin
Mobile networks are connecting the world. More and more mobile network subscribers rely on a secure connection for their communication. The Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) protocol variants used in mobile networks are crucial to ensure integrity and confidentiality of communication. In this thesis, we analyze different AKA protocol variants currently deployed by leveraging formal models and the Tamarin security protocol verification tool. Specifically, we first formally model individual
more » ... KA protocol variants and present the necessary requirements, i.e., minimal assumptions, to satisfy certain security properties. Second, we provide a comparison of the resulting security guarantees of individual AKA protocol variants. Finally, we formally analyze combinations of AKA protocol variants to model the co-existence of multiple mobile network generations. The analysis shows that newer AKA protocol variants improve security guarantees compared to older variants. However, the newest standard is still unable to satisfy certain security properties without extra assumptions that are not part of the actual protocol specification. When combining multiple AKA protocol variants, as happens in the real world, stronger assumptions must be made to satisfy the same security properties. i HN ) KeyOrSupi ¬ch ¬supi ¬K ∨ ¬supi ¬ch NIA on idUE kc ∧ KeyOrSupi ¬K ∨ (¬supi ∧ ¬sk HN ) KeyOrSupi ¬ch ¬supi ¬K ∨ ¬supi IA on idUE (const.
doi:10.3929/ethz-b-000372339 fatcat:7qghp5bmerh63brqbuse2ufeb4