A Terrorist-fraud Resistant and Extractor-free Anonymous Distance-bounding Protocol

Gildas Avoine, Xavier Bultel, Sébastien Gambs, David Gérault, Pascal Lafourcade, Cristina Onete, Jean-Marc Robert
2017 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '17  
Distance-bounding protocols have been introduced to thwart relay attacks against contactless authentication protocols. In this context, verifiers have to authenticate the credentials of untrusted provers. Unfortunately, these protocols are themselves subject to complex threats such as terrorist-fraud attacks, in which a malicious prover helps an accomplice to authenticate. Provably guaranteeing the resistance of distance-bounding protocols to these attacks is a complex task. The classical
more » ... rmeasures usually assume that rational provers want to protect their long-term authentication credentials, even with respect to their accomplices. Thus, terrorist-fraud resistant protocols generally rely on artificial extraction mechanisms, ensuring that an accomplice can retrieve the credential of his partnering prover. In this paper, we propose a novel approach to obtain provable terroristfraud resistant protocols without assuming that provers have any longterm secret key. Instead, the attacker simply has to replay the information that he has received from his accomplice. Based on this, we present a generic construction for provably secure distance-bounding protocols, and give three instances: (1) an efficient symmetric-key protocol, (2) a public-key protocol protecting the identities of the provers against external eavesdroppers, and finally (3) a fully anonymous protocol protecting the identities of the provers even against malicious verifiers trying to profile them.
doi:10.1145/3052973.3053000 dblp:conf/ccs/AvoineBGG0OR17 fatcat:itgunnhgurevdd7oldniin27ha