Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid--seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non--commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal

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... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. RECENT DECISIONS RECENT DECISIONS But the limits of this later case have been very closely drawn by subse- quent Kentucky cases. See Scott v. Laws, 185 Ky. 440, 215 S. W. 81. The great weight of modern authority is in direct conflict with these cases, and the leading case of Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, supra, has been expressedly criticized and repudiated by the courts of other States. See Murray v. Allard, 100 Tenn. 100, 43 S. W. 355, 39 L. R. A. 249, 66 Am. St. Rep. 740. Thus it is usually held that a reservation of "all mines, minerals, and metals" includes both petroleum and natural gas. Murray v. Allard, supra; Weaver v. Richards, 156 Mich. 320, 120 N. W. 818; Suit v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S. E. 307. It is always a question of what was intended to be included. And considering the present commercial importance of both oil and gas, it seems sound both on principle and on authority that the presumption should be that oil and gas are to be included in the term mineral. TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-UNFAIR COMPETITION-INJUNCTION.- The defendant manufactured and sold as a beverage a compound known as "Koke" which was commonly called "Dope". The plaintiff, who manufactured and sold a beverage under the trade name of "Coca-Cola", sought to have the defendant enjoined from using either the word "Koke" or "Dope". The bill alleged that the defendant's mixture was made and sold in imitation of the plaintiff's and that in certain localities the word "Dope" was used by the public to call for "Coca-Cola". Held, an injunction for restraint of the use of "Koke" will be granted, but as to "Dope" the injunction will not be granted. Coca-Cola Company v. Koke Company of America, 41 Sup. Ct. 113. The general principle that unfair competition in its essence consists of passing or attempting to pass the goods or business of one as the goods or business of another has been reaffirmed in recent cases. Auto Acetylene Light Co. v. Prest-O-Lite Co., 264 Fed. 810; Handel Co. v. Jefferson Glass Co., 265 Fed. 286; Tweedie v. Royal Co., 267 Fed. 224. The criterion is whether or not the alleged infringing trade-mark is calculated to deceive the ordinary purchaser, not the careful buyer. Handel Co. v. Jefferson Glass Co., supra: Ansehl v. Williams, 267 Fed. 9; Bregstone v. Greenburg, 182 N. Y. Supp. 340. It is not essential to the granting of an injunction for the plaintiff to show that some person has been actually deceived. Lucile v. Schrier, 181 N. Y. Supp. 694. "A manifest liability to deception is sufficient." Fuller v. Huff, 104 Fed. 141, 43 C. C. A. 453, 51 L. R. A. 332; Reading Stove Works v. Howes Co., 201 Mass. 437, 87 N. E. 751, 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 979. Nor where damage is highly probable need the plaintiff wait until he has suffered actual injury, but may forestall loss by equitable means. Powell v. Valentine (Kan.), 189 Pac. 163. Where a wholesaler places in the hands of a retailer an article with which to deceive the public, he may be enjoined though he does not mislead or intend to mislead the retailer. Fox v. Glynn, 191 Mass. 344, 78 N. E. 89, 114 Am. St. Rep. 619, 9 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1096 and note.