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Run Away If You Can: Persistent Jamming Attacks against Channel Hopping Wi-Fi Devices in Dense Networks
[chapter]
2014
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Wireless local area networks (WLANs) can adopt channel hopping technologies in order to avoid unintentional interferences such as radars or microwaves, which function as proactive jamming signals. Even though channel hopping technologies are effective against proactive types of jamming, it has been reported that reactive jammers could attack the targets through scanning busy channels. In this paper, we demonstrate that reactive jamming is only effective against channel hopping Wi-Fi devices in
doi:10.1007/978-3-319-11379-1_18
fatcat:zsrecs2jffc25pmkhbvkh2wfvm