Frege's judgement stroke

Nicholas J.J. Smith
2000 Australasian Journal of Philosophy  
This paper brings to light a new puzzle for Frege interpretation, and offers a solution to that puzzle. The puzzle concerns Frege's judgement-stroke ('|'), and consists in a tension between three of Frege's claims. First, Frege vehemently maintains that psychological considerations should have no place in logic. Second, Frege regards the judgementstroke-and the associated dissociation of assertoric force from content, of the act of judgement from the subject matter about which judgement is
more » ... h judgement is made-as a crucial part of his logic. Third, Frege holds that judging is an inner mental process, and that the distinction marked by the judgement-stroke, between entertaining a thought and judging that it is true, is a psychological distinction. I argue that what initially looks like confusion here on Frege's part appears quite reasonable when we remind ourselves of the differences between Frege's conception of logic and our own.
doi:10.1080/00048400012349451 fatcat:ezn5oet5zbch7dbhuugob4ajma