Exchangeable Equilibria, Part I: Symmetric Bimatrix Games [article]

Noah D. Stein, Asuman Ozdaglar, Pablo A. Parrilo
2014 arXiv   pre-print
We introduce the notion of exchangeable equilibria of a symmetric bimatrix game, defined as those correlated equilibria in which players' strategy choices are conditionally independently and identically distributed given some hidden variable. We give several game-theoretic interpretations and a version of the "revelation principle". Geometrically, the set of exchangeable equilibria is convex and lies between the symmetric Nash equilibria and the symmetric correlated equilibria. Exchangeable
more » ... libria can achieve higher expected utility than symmetric Nash equilibria.
arXiv:1307.3586v3 fatcat:46yq7yo7dvcvfpkb66t5afy6lm