Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid--seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries. We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non--commercial purposes. Read more about Early Journal

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... ntent at http://about.jstor.org/participate--jstor/individuals/early-journal--content. JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not--for--profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org. 1901.] NOTES OF CASES. 67 was held entitled to the insurance money. Skinner v. Houghton, 48 Atl. 85. It is difficult to distinguish the situation of the unpaid vendor, before conveyance of title, from that of a mortgagee; and by the great weight of authority, where the mortgagee insures for his own benefit, the right of subrogation exists in behalf of the insurance company. Carpenter v. Providence etc. Co., 16 Pet. 495. COVENANTS RUNNING WITH LAND -WxIR'ia.s BROKEN COVENANTS PASS TO GRANTEE.-The common-law rule that only unbroken covenants of title run with the land, recently received careful consideration by the New York Court of Appeals, in Geiszler v. DeGraaf, 59 N. E. 993, and was repudiated. In 2 Minor's Inst. (4th ed. ) 717, it is said that " no covenant which is broken is capable of being afterwards assigned at law. When, therefore, a covenant is violated, the suit must be brought by the party at that time interested, and not by one to whom the land may afterwards have come by assignment "-citing Dickinson v. Hoomes, 8 Gratt. 353, 396; Marbury v. Thornton, 82 Va. 705; Washington etc. Bank v. Thornton, 33 Va. 164. In none of these cases was the precise question involved, and what was said on the subject was obiter. The rule had its origin in the familiar common-law principle denying the assignability of choses in action-unbroken covenants running with the land conveyed being almost, if not quite, the sole exception. In dealing with the question, the New York court, in the principal case, said: "It was the general rule of the common law that all covenants for title ran with the land until breach. In this State it has been held that a breach of the covenants of seisin, of right to convey, and against incumbrances occurred, if at all, upon delivery of the deed, while those for quiet enjoyment, warranty, and for further assurance were not broken until an eviction, actual or constructive. Rawle, Cov. (5th ed.), sec. 202, and note. And -it has been generally held that those of the former class do not run with the land, while the latter do. The foundation of this distinction is not clearly traceable among the early English decisions. The principal reason for it, however, seems to have been that at common law no privity of estate or tenure existed between a covenantor and a remote covenantee, and, therefore, when a breach of a covenant of title occurred, if it was not such a covenant as was affixed to the land and ran with it, it could not be taken advantage of by a remote covenantee or a stranger to the original covenant, since it was, as to him, a mere chose in action, and at common law choses in action were not assignable. But now choses in action are assignable, and the question is whether the ancient law concerning the covenant against incumbrances has survived the reasons upon which it was founded. " The operation of the common-law rule upon the grantee seeking to enforce the covenant against incumbrances was always inconvenient, and the rule itself exceedingly illogical. While it was held that the breach occurred upon delivery of the deed, it was also held that the covenantee could not recover more than nominal damages until he had paid off the incumbrance, or had been actually or constructively evicted. Delavergne v. Norris, 7 Johns. 358; Hall v. Dean, 13 Johns. 105; Stanard v. Eldridge, 16 Johns. 254; Grant v. Tallman, 20 N. Y. 191; McGuckin v. Milbank, 152 N. Y. 297, 46 N. E. 490. It was virtually held that, when the incumbrance was a money charge which the grantee could remove, 1901.] NOTES OF CASES. 67