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Sequential Mechanisms with ex-post Participation Guarantees
[article]
2016
arXiv
pre-print
We provide a characterization of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanisms in settings where a monopolist sells k items over k periods to a buyer who realizes his value for item i in the beginning of period i. We require that the mechanism satisfies a strong individual rationality constraint, requiring that the stage utility of each agent be positive during each period. We show that the optimum mechanism can be computed by solving a nested sequence of static (single-period) mechanisms that optimize a
arXiv:1603.07229v2
fatcat:y3z53n3vjvbl5atzlhqc5a663a