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The Pollution Game: A Classroom Exercise Demonstrating the Relative Effectiveness of Emissions Taxes and Tradable Permits
2009
Social Science Research Network
This classroom game illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of various regulatory frameworks aimed at internalizing negative externalities from pollution. Specifically, the game divides students into three groups-a government regulatory agency and two polluting firms-and allows them to work through a system of uniform command-and-control regulation, a tradable emissions permit framework, and an emissions tax. Students observe how flexible, marketoriented regulatory frameworks can outperform
doi:10.2139/ssrn.1430655
fatcat:x7eycdft4zgvpfputvkj3apevu