A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2004; you can also visit <a rel="external noopener" href="http://www.ssc.wisc.edu:80/~yche/grouprev3.pdf">the original URL</a>. The file type is <code>application/pdf</code>.
Joint Liability and Peer Monitoring under Group Lending
<span title="2002-01-03">2002</span>
<i title="Walter de Gruyter GmbH">
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/container/xnwy3vhj2vhxncjxpfl7x372ma" style="color: black;">Contributions to Theoretical Economics</a>
</i>
Preserved Fulltext
This paper studies an incentive rationale for the use of group lending as a method of financing liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs. The joint liability feature associated with group lending lowers the liquidity risk of default but creates a free-riding problem. In the static setting, the free-riding problem dominates the liquidity risk effect under a plausible condition, thus making group lending unattractive. When the projects are repeated infinitely many times, however, the joint liability
<span class="external-identifiers">
<a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1016">doi:10.2202/1534-5971.1016</a>
<a target="_blank" rel="external noopener" href="https://fatcat.wiki/release/bxokbqv4hjd6pjxrmxcbk6bkye">fatcat:bxokbqv4hjd6pjxrmxcbk6bkye</a>
</span>
more »
... ature provides the group members with a credible means of exercising peer sanction, which can make the group lending attractive, relative to individual lending. JEL Numbers: C72, D80, G32 and L14.
<a target="_blank" rel="noopener" href="https://web.archive.org/web/20040821121847/http://www.ssc.wisc.edu:80/~yche/grouprev3.pdf" title="fulltext PDF download" data-goatcounter-click="serp-fulltext" data-goatcounter-title="serp-fulltext">
<button class="ui simple right pointing dropdown compact black labeled icon button serp-button">
<i class="icon ia-icon"></i>
Web Archive
[PDF]
<div class="menu fulltext-thumbnail">
<img src="https://blobs.fatcat.wiki/thumbnail/pdf/d0/a1/d0a10af716303590fcad3dfee98d54a62872790e.180px.jpg" alt="fulltext thumbnail" loading="lazy">
</div>
</button>
</a>
<a target="_blank" rel="external noopener noreferrer" href="https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-5971.1016">
<button class="ui left aligned compact blue labeled icon button serp-button">
<i class="external alternate icon"></i>
Publisher / doi.org
</button>
</a>