A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2010; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is
BARGAINING VERSUS FIGHTING
Defence and Peace Economics
I examine the determinants of con ‡ict and settlement by embedding probabilistic contests in a bargaining framework. Di¤erent costly enforcement e¤orts (e.g., arming, litigation expenditures) induce di¤erent disagreement points and Pareto frontiers. After examining the incentives for settlement, I demonstrate how di¤erent division rules and bargaining norms have real, economic e¤ects. I then analyze some sources of con ‡ict. I emphasize long-term, strategic considerations by examining andoi:10.1080/10242690601025617 fatcat:ckvsp2ynybhtno2ht7mygpc7k4