The equal split-off set for cooperative games

Rodica Branzei, Dinko Dimitrov, Stef Tijs
2006 Game Theory and Mathematical Economics   unpublished
The Equal Split-Off Set for Cooperative Games Branzei, M.R.; Dimitrov, D.A.; Tijs, S.H. Abstract In this paper the equal split-off set is introduced as a new solution concept for cooperative games. This solution is based on egalitarian considerations and it turns out that for superadditive games the equal split-off set is a subset of the equal division core. Moreover, the proposed solution is single valued on the class of convex games and it coincides with the Dutta-Ray constrained egalitarian
more » ... rained egalitarian solution.
doi:10.4064/bc71-0-3 fatcat:gabx2epubvb4jaxwl6qkt3vtsa