Preemptive Investment under Uncertainty

Jan-Henrik Steg
2015 Social Science Research Network  
This paper provides a general characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria for a strategic timing problem, where two firms have the (real) option to invest irreversibly in some market. Profit streams are uncertain and depend on the market structure. The analysis of the problem emphasizes its dynamic nature and exploits only its economic structure. In particular, the determination of equilibria with preemption is reduced to solving a single class of constrained stopping problems. The general
more » ... lems. The general results are applied to typical state-space models from the literature, to point out common deficits in equilibrium arguments and to suggest alternative equilibria that are Pareto improvements.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2689572 fatcat:madndyw5ebgz5ee2sdjk7y4lcu