NEW BOOKS

JOHN EDGAR
1913 Mind  
NEW BOOKS. given to intuition as opposed to intellect and reason; in Boutroux and Milhaud, the criticism of logical standards or principles of science, with the corresponding assumption that the thought or intelligence of the scientist is creative of truth and does not merely reproduce a truth which exists once for all in reality ; the conception of reality as action, as creation, for example in Loisv's insistence on the idea that religious truth is not from the first a ready-made and completed
more » ... thing, but is living and therefore changing, developing through the "absolute imminence" of thought ID human history, individual and general; all these are represented as Hegelian in tendency. In Part III. a similar movement is shown in England and in America. We hare the rise of empiricism and naturalism, from Hamilton and Mansel through Mill, Bain and Spencwr to Clifford, issuing in the Pragmatism of James, Dewey and Schiller ; on the other side the development of idealism in Stirling, Green, Bradley, Caird, and the present day representatives, McTaggart (from whose name the Me is unfortunately omitted), Royce and Bailhe. In this movement the relation to Hegel is of course much more obvious tlian in France or in Germany, since all of the second group of writers have made him their starting-point, but even in Pragmatism, de Ruggiero is able to point to a Hegelian influence. In Part IV. the first chapter gives a sketch of the Renaissance philosophy in Italy, and the revival of its spirit in Rosmini, etc. ; the second shows the general trend at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, the new positivism of Ardigo, the monism of Varisco, and Neo-Kantianism; while the third chapter deals with Spaventa and other Hegelian idealists, and the literary and economic outgrowths of the movement. The outcome of the work is that in modern philosophy we have the completion of a process which began in the criticism of Kant, and is now culminating in the complete disappearance from serious philosophy of the idea of reality as transcendent to thought, the victory of the conception of thought as immanent in reality, and of experience as not merely a reproduction or copy of reality, but as productive or creative of reality. So the criticism of science has brought us to see the true centre of reality not in fixed or fundamental laws, but in the living human thought (p. 451). From the Hegelian system, that system which at one time seemed so remote from life, there has sprung up, almost everywhere, a movement towards the identification of philosophy with life. The work may be strongly recommended, not only for the interest of its subject, and the accuracy and range of knowledge displayed, but also for its critical sense and the clearness of its style.
doi:10.1093/mind/xxii.4.308 fatcat:e2j433dkevhanbzyicmjenmbnu