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Optimal mechanisms with simple menus
2014
Proceedings of the fifteenth ACM conference on Economics and computation - EC '14
We consider optimal mechanism design for the case with one buyer and two items. The buyer's valuations towards the two items are independent and additive. In this setting, optimal mechanism is unknown for general valuation distributions. We obtain two categories of structural results that shed light on the optimal mechanisms. These results can be summarized into one conclusion: under certain conditions, the optimal mechanisms have simple menus. The first category of results state that, under
doi:10.1145/2600057.2602863
dblp:conf/sigecom/WangT14
fatcat:fm7k3ru2y5d6xoqvrbesenl2di