How to crowdsource tasks truthfully without sacrificing utility: Online incentive mechanisms with budget constraint

Dong Zhao, Xiang-Yang Li, Huadong Ma
2014 IEEE INFOCOM 2014 - IEEE Conference on Computer Communications  
Mobile crowdsourced sensing (MCS) is a new paradigm which takes advantage of the pervasive smartphones to efficiently collect data, enabling numerous novel applications. To achieve good service quality for a MCS application, incentive mechanisms are necessary to attract more user participation. Most of existing mechanisms apply only for the offline scenario where all users' information are known a priori. On the contrary, we focus on a more realistic scenario where users arrive one by one
more » ... in a random order. Based on the online auction model, we investigate the problem that users submit their private types to the crowdsourcer when arrive, and the crowdsourcer aims at selecting a subset of users before a specified deadline for maximizing the value of the services (assumed to be a nonnegative monotone submodular function) provided by selected users under a budget constraint. We design two online mechanisms, OMZ and OMG, satisfying the computational efficiency, individual rationality, budget feasibility, truthfulness, consumer sovereignty and constant competitiveness under the zero arrivaldeparture interval case and a more general case, respectively. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the performance and validate the theoretical properties of our online mechanisms.
doi:10.1109/infocom.2014.6848053 dblp:conf/infocom/ZhaoLM14 fatcat:sjpjt7mxkngtzgql27vtmyzgli