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Towards Verifying Voter Privacy through Unlinkability
[chapter]
2013
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
The increasing official use of security protocols for electronic voting deepens the need for their trustworthiness, hence for their formal verification. The impossibility of linking a voter to her vote, often called voter privacy or ballot secrecy, is the core property of many such protocols. Most existing work relies on equivalence statements in cryptographic extensions of process calculi. This paper provides the first theorem-proving based verification of voter privacy and overcomes some of
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-36563-8_7
fatcat:36yjp4oqcbdqloum3k5yad7rxu