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Advances in the theory of large cooperative games and applications to club theory; the side payments case
[unknown]
The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions
unpublished
In a series of papers (Kovalenkov and authors have developed the framework of parameterized collections of games and also that of parameterized collections of economies with clubs. These papers apply to collections of games with nontransferable utility and similarly to economies with clubs and general preferences. The game theoretic framework encompasses the earlier pregame' framework (cf., Wooders 1994b Econometrica) and also earlier models of economies with clubs and with possibly multiple
doi:10.4337/9781781009888.00009
fatcat:l3he6eokhveohoeugvnyr7q2g4