Extending the Limits II: Intellectual Artworks [chapter]

Jiri Benovsky
2020 Where is the Gödel-point hiding: Gentzen's Consistency Proof of 1936 and His Representation of Constructive Ordinals  
In this chapter, I defend the view that scientific and philosophical theories genuinely (as opposed to metaphorically) possess aesthetic properties and that they are genuine cases of artworks. In order to do so, I argue against the sensory dependence thesis according to which aesthetic properties necessarily depend on sensory properties. The case of intellectual artworks such as theories, as well as other cases of works of art like novels, show us that there is no such dependence, and we can
more » ... ence, and we can then extend our understanding of what counts as art to such types of objects.
doi:10.1007/978-3-030-54795-0_3 fatcat:okofrocq4bc7rc2pkkaqzepwly