Strategic Analysis of WMD Nonproliferation: Iraq and After Iraq

Kaoru Ishiguro
2017 International Relations and Diplomacy  
We examine two strategies for the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): "sanctions" and "monitoring and inspections". Our main conclusions are summarized as follows. Firstly, there is a substitutive relationship between sanctions and monitoring and inspections. We posit that the proliferation of WMD may be prevented through intensified sanctions or increased monitoring and inspections. Secondly, monitoring activities may be decreased through the increased effectiveness of
more » ... ectiveness of sanctions aimed at preventing proliferation. Thirdly, if the increased development costs of WMD can decrease the need for inspection activities sufficiently, the extent of monitoring activities could also reduce. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF WMD NONPROLIFERATION: IRAQ AND AFTER IRAQ 306 insisted on the disarmament of WMD through UN inspections, while the US and UK urged the UN to use military sanctions. The purpose of this study is to examine two strategies of nonproliferation of WMD: "sanctions" and "monitoring and inspections". In particular, we consider the effects of sanctions on monitoring and inspections. WMD include nuclear weapons, biological weapons, and chemical weapons. The international community is subject to the following treaties: the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT, opened for signature in 1968), the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC, signed in 1972), and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, signed in 1993). These treaties intend to enforce WMD disarmament with the use of monitoring and inspection, and use admonitions and sanctions in the event of non-compliance. However, there is no system of inspection and verification of biological weapons 1 . Our main conclusions are summarized as follows. Firstly, there is a substitutive relationship between sanctions and monitoring and inspections. We posit that it is possible to prevent proliferation of WMD by using intensified sanctions or increased monitoring and inspections. Secondly, increased sanctions lead to a decrease in monitoring activities without affecting inspections, while the increased benefits of monitoring allow such activities to increase without affecting inspections. Thirdly, if increased costs of development of WMD could sufficiently decrease the extent of inspection activities, they would also reduce the extent of monitoring activities. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set up a model of nonproliferation of WMD using a simple game theory, and in section 3, we examine the equilibrium of the model. In section 4, we discuss the problem of WMD in Iraq and analyze two Security Council Resolutions regarding monitoring, inspections, and sanctions. In section 5, we consider the problem of nonproliferation of WMD in the context of Iraq from the point of view of international political circumstances, reputation effects, and supply controls. In section 6, we summarize some conclusions. Model of Nonproliferation of WMD We set up a simple model to examine nonproliferation of WMD using monitoring, inspections, and sanctions. The model in this study expands the conventional deterrence theory as an aid to monitoring and inspections 2 . This model is a one-shot game model with four stages. Players. Suppose there are two players in this game, the "UN Security Council" and the "potential proliferator". The UN Security Council is expressed as a representative of the international community, and its behavioral purpose is to prevent the potential proliferator from developing WMD under NPT, BWC, and CWC. The potential proliferator aims to develop WMD. In particular, the potential proliferators, who have tense relationships with their neighboring nations, are going to earn political and military advantages by developing WMD. We suppose that the UN Security Council and the potential proliferator are risk neutral.
doi:10.17265/2328-2134/2017.06.001 fatcat:5hfkydzw2vggvbbu3dtuq24ihy