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On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
[chapter]
2009
Lecture Notes in Computer Science
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible items to players having additive utility functions over the items. We consider allocations in which no player envies the bundle of items allocated to the other players too much. We present a simple proof that deterministic truthful allocations do not minimize envy by characterizing the truthful mechanisms for two players and two items. Also, we present an analysis for uniformly random allocations which are naturally truthful in
doi:10.1007/978-3-642-04428-1_10
fatcat:obq6t36yyvg2pn46r2cuw3dh2q