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Tax competition when firms choose their organizational form: Should tax loopholes for multinationals be closed?
2005
We analyze a sequential game between two symmetric countries whenfirms can invest in a multinational structure that confers taxsavings. Governments are able to commit to long-run taxdiscrimination policies before firms' decisions are made andbefore statutory capital tax rates are chosen non-cooperatively.Whether a coordinated reduction in the tax preferences granted tomobile firms is beneficial or harmful for the competing countriesdepends critically on the elasticity with which the
doi:10.5282/ubm/epub.729
fatcat:wtajlxrqcrgxznof4pig4y2vfm