A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2020; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
Provably Secure Isolation for Interruptible Enclaved Execution on Small Microprocessors: Extended Version
[article]
2020
arXiv
pre-print
Computer systems often provide hardware support for isolation mechanisms like privilege levels, virtual memory, or enclaved execution. Over the past years, several successful software-based side-channel attacks have been developed that break, or at least significantly weaken the isolation that these mechanisms offer. Extending a processor with new architectural or micro-architectural features, brings a risk of introducing new such side-channel attacks. This paper studies the problem of
arXiv:2001.10881v1
fatcat:dxq3ppl5urczjl5pbt6ruhdj2e