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Acquisitions, Overconfident Managers and Self-attribution Bias
2007
European Financial Management
We examine whether acquisitions by overconfident managers generate superior abnormal returns and whether managerial overconfidence stems from self-attribution. Self-attribution bias suggests that overconfidence plays a greater role in higher order acquisition deals predicting lower wealth effects for higher order acquisition deals. We find evidence in support of the view that average stock returns are related to managerial overconfidence. Overconfident bidders realize lower announcement returns
doi:10.1111/j.1468-036x.2007.00371.x
fatcat:s5o5nwt5wjbexa3qhy2ultfdsq