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Improving Confidentiality Against Cache-based SCAs
2018
unpublished
Preserved Fulltext
Side channels and covert channels can give untrusted applications access to the trusted and sensitive data in order to retrieve private information.. In this poster, we present a countermeasure called the Smartflush against cache-based Side Channel Attacks (SCAs). The Smartflush is a quick-patch countermeasure proposed to counter timing attacks that exploit inclusive caches in Intel's x86 architecture. The proposed countermeasure is tested against recent attacks like Flush+Reload. Results show
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