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Analysis on Risk Appetite of Peer-to-Peer Lending Platforms under Market Competition-Based on Extended Hoteling Model
2018
Proceedings of the 2018 International Conference on Management, Economics, Education and Social Sciences (MEESS 2018)
unpublished
This paper analyzes risk appetite of P2P lending platforms under market competition based on extended Hoteling model. It is shown that there exists a Nash equilibrium in the competition between P2P lending platforms in which all platforms provide only low or high risk bids. Specifically, all platforms will provide high risk bids only when the marginal cost of high risk bids differs greatly between platforms, and provide low risk bids only when the difference is not so obvious. In conclusion,
doi:10.2991/meess-18.2018.15
fatcat:qvprp2i5tngdfemtjk7gebgffa