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Resilience of Deployed TCP to Blind Attacks
2015
Proceedings of the 2015 ACM Conference on Internet Measurement Conference - IMC '15
As part of TCP's steady evolution, recent standards have recommended mechanisms to protect against weaknesses in TCP. But adoption, configuration, and deployment of TCP improvements can be slow. In this work, we consider the resilience of deployed TCP implementations to blind in-window attacks, where an off-path adversary disrupts an established connection by sending a packet that the victim believes came from its peer, causing data corruption or connection reset. We tested operating systems
doi:10.1145/2815675.2815700
dblp:conf/imc/LuckieBWAc15
fatcat:bjtenepqevhqpkfrxcighlzmvu