Spinoza's Affective Scepticism [chapter]

2020 2019  
Spinoza is known to have made it the business of his philosophyt op resent us with the most immediate alternative to Descarteswith regard to virtuallyevery fundamental philosophical subject: while Descartesi sad ualist,S pinoza is at once am onist (with respect to substance) and ap luralist (with respect to attributes); while for Descartes, philosophyb egins with the I, for Spinoza, it begins with God or the self-caused; while Descartess harplyd istinguishes between the human intellect and the
more » ... ill, consideringt he former finite and the latter infinite, Spinoza insists that they,like all the other faculties,are one and the same thing;like others, notably Malebranche, Spinoza rejects Descartes'sm ind-bodyi nteractionism,r idicules the notion that the pineal gland is the seat of the soul, and argues instead for ap arallelist conception of the psychosomatic relation; while for Descartes,wonder (admiration)i s" the first of all the passions," for Spinoza, wonder (admiratio)i sn ot even a passion, but merely "an imagination of athing in which the mind remains fixed because this singular imagination has no connection with others";² and the list can be further extended. On the face of it,t he subject of scepticism appears to be yeta nother case in point: while Cartesianism proceeds from doubt,S pinozism proceeds from certainty. Indeed, the receivedscholarlyview is that in direct opposition to Descartes'smethod of doubt,which is commonlyconsidered aradical formofscepticism that marks the  Ia mv ery grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their generous comments and suggestions on ad raft of this essay. Ia lso thank Máté Veres, Rachel Aumiller,B ehnam Zolghadr,N ancyA bigail
doi:10.1515/9783110618839-010 fatcat:3uq5edejnnfuvhae2nfudzwuuu