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Pairwise interactive knowledge and Nash equilibrium
[component]
2012
unpublished
Preserved Fulltext
We provide epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, which are considerably weaker than the standard ones by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) . Indeed, we simultaneously replace common knowledge of conjectures and mutual knowledge of rationality with strictly weaker epistemic conditions of pairwise common knowledge of conjectures and pairwise mutual knowledge of rationality respectively. It is also shown that, unlike the Aumann and Brandenburger's conditions, ours do not imply common knowledge
doi:10.26481/umamet.2012008
fatcat:zmytnwi6u5blzgxro6bedgihlm