Pairwise interactive knowledge and Nash equilibrium [component]

Bach C.W., Tsakas E.
2012 unpublished
We provide epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium, which are considerably weaker than the standard ones by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995) . Indeed, we simultaneously replace common knowledge of conjectures and mutual knowledge of rationality with strictly weaker epistemic conditions of pairwise common knowledge of conjectures and pairwise mutual knowledge of rationality respectively. It is also shown that, unlike the Aumann and Brandenburger's conditions, ours do not imply common knowledge
more » ... f rationality. Surprisingly, they actually do not even imply mutual knowledge of rationality.
doi:10.26481/umamet.2012008 fatcat:zmytnwi6u5blzgxro6bedgihlm