We conduct a field experiment to measure cooperation among groups of recreational fishermen at a privately owned fishing facility. The parameters are chosen so that group earnings are greater when group members catch fewer fish, as in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism (VCM). In a manner consistent with classical economic theory, though in contrast to prior results from laboratory experiments, we find no evidence of cooperation. We construct a series of additional treatments to identify

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... s of the difference. We rule out the subject pool and the laboratory setting as potential causes, and identify the type of activity involved as the source of the lack of cooperation in our field experiment. When cooperation requires a reduction in fishing effort, individuals are not cooperative, whether the reduction in fishing translates into more money or into more fishing opportunities for the group. JEL Classification: C72, C92, C93. * We are grateful to the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research, NWO, for financial support as part of the Program on Evolution and Behavior. We would like to thank Ad and Thea van Oirschot for use of their fishing facility, and Stef van Kessel, Mike Groels, and Paul Ludeña Delgado for excellent research assistance. We are grateful to Niels van den Broek, Machiel Driesser, Patrick Hullegie, Sander Tuit, Alexandra van Geen and Peter van Oudheusden for their help in conducting the field sessions. We also thank Wieland Müller, Jan Potters, Ernan Haruvy, Amrita Ray Chaudury, Eline van der Heijden, David Voňka, Cees Withagen and especially Amos Zemel for their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper.