Some philosophers have argued that the use of drones and related UAV technologies in warfare is in principle morally problematic. 1 Often, these accounts make the claim that something about the absence of sufficient risk to the pilot makes the employment of drones somehow unfair, indecent, or unvirtuous in some respect. 2 Other philosophers, however, have argued that that there is in fact no in principle reason that speaks against the use of such technologies in warfare, and that under certain

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... ircumstances, it might be not just permissible but indeed obligatory to employ such technologies. 3 Lastly, there have been many and various contingent arguments for and against the use of drones ranging from moral concerns about proliferation, to moral hazard and overuse, to issues of government transparency, to PTS and moral injury experienced by pilots, to dangers of inciting eventual blowback. 4 By now, many of these in-principle as well as contingent ethical arguments surrounding the