Routing games with an unknown set of active players

Itai Ashlagi, Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz
2007 Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems - AAMAS '07  
In many settings there exists a set of potential participants, but the set of participants who are actually active in the system, and in particular their number, is unknown. This topic has been first analyzed by Ashlagi, Monderer, and Tennenholtz [AMT] in the context of simple routing games, where the network consists of a set of parallel links, and the agents can not split their jobs among different paths. AMT used the model of pre-Bayesian games, and the concept of safetylevel equilibrium for
more » ... vel equilibrium for the analysis of these games. In this paper we extend the work by AMT. We deal with splitable routing games, where each player can split his job among paths in a given network. In this context we generalize the analysis to all two-node networks, in which paths may intersect in unrestricted manner. We characterize the relationships between the number of potential participants and the number of active participants under which ignorance is beneficial to each of the active participants. 1 Some recent works deal with incomplete information about other paramters in the Bayesian setting [7, 8] .
doi:10.1145/1329125.1329362 dblp:conf/atal/AshlagiMT07 fatcat:ze3lsdogvbc65bso4dexpcuyn4