Bringing Belief Base Change into Dynamic Epistemic Logic [article]

Marlo Souza, Álvaro Moreira
<span title="2019-12-22">2019</span> <i > arXiv </i> &nbsp; <span class="release-stage" >pre-print</span>
AGM's belief revision is one of the main paradigms in the study of belief change operations. In this context, belief bases (prioritised bases) have been primarily used to specify the agent's belief state. While the connection of iterated AGM-like operations and their encoding in dynamic epistemic logics have been studied before, few works considered how well-known postulates from iterated belief revision theory can be characterised by means of belief bases and their counterpart in dynamic
more &raquo; ... mic logic. Particularly, it has been shown that some postulates can be characterised through transformations in priority graphs, while others may not be represented that way. This work investigates changes in the semantics of Dynamic Preference Logic that give rise to an appropriate syntactic representation for its models that allow us to represent and reason about iterated belief base change in this logic.
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