A copy of this work was available on the public web and has been preserved in the Wayback Machine. The capture dates from 2017; you can also visit the original URL.
The file type is application/pdf
.
On the Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous Games: Three Counterexamples
2003
Social Science Research Network
We study whether we can weaken the conditions given in Reny [4] and still obtain existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria in quasiconcave normal form games, or, at least, existence of pure strategy ε−equilibria for all ε > 0. We show by examples that there are: 1. quasiconcave, payoff secure games without pure strategy ε−equilibria for small enough ε > 0 (and hence, without pure strategy Nash equilibria), 2. quasiconcave, reciprocally upper semicontinuous games without pure strategy
doi:10.2139/ssrn.882140
fatcat:c5p52lrdhbgclgiyaeyxpigufi