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Robot rights? Towards a social-relational justification of moral consideration
2010
Ethics and Information Technology
Should we grant rights to artificially intelligent robots? Most current and near-future robots do not meet the hard criteria set by deontological and utilitarian theory. Virtue ethics can avoid this problem with its indirect approach. However, both direct and indirect arguments for moral consideration rest on ontological features of entities, an approach which incurs several problems. In response to these difficulties, this paper taps into a different conceptual resource in order to be able to
doi:10.1007/s10676-010-9235-5
fatcat:jomvhridwzawdatbhb2hozgjqq