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Adverse Selection, Moral Hazard, and Grower Compliance with Bt Corn Refuge
[chapter]
Regulating Agricultural Biotechnology: Economics and Policy
Preserved Fulltext
This paper develops a principal-agent model of farmer compliance with Bt corn refuge requirements intended to manage the evolution of resistance to the Bt toxin by insect pests. The model endogenizes the price of the technology, the audit rate, and the fine imposed on non-complying farmers when farmer willingness to pay for Bt corn and compliance effort is private information.
doi:10.1007/978-0-387-36953-2_27
fatcat:7mdmezgv6vh6zopyvzakjpi6du