Power Brokers: Middlemen in Legislative Bargaining

Matias Iaryczower, Santiago Oliveros
2013 Social Science Research Network  
We study a model of decentralized legislative bargaining over public decisions with transfers. We establish the emergence of middlemen in legislative bargaining as a robust equilibrium phenomenon. We show that legislative intermediation can impact policy outcomes, and can be inefficient. To fulfill this role, the middleman's policy preferences and bargaining position must be such to make his role of intermediary credible. But the political middleman must also directly benefit from policy
more » ... from policy change. The results highlight fundamental differences between the role of intermediaries in politics and exchange economies. JEL codes D72, C72, C78.
doi:10.2139/ssrn.2236557 fatcat:jmljw3cunfbi3jjfbzvc3ch2nq