On Stoic Self-Contradictions: ἀδικεῖν vs. βλάπτειν in Chrysippus (SVF III, 289)
О самопротиворечиях стоиков: ἀδικεῖν vs. βλάπτειν у Хрисиппа (SVF III, 289)

Andrei Seregin
2020 SCHOLE  
In this article, I offer an analysis of Chrysippus' treatment of "injustice" (ἀδικία) in SVF III, 289. First, I show that he espouses two theses: I) Every injustice is an act of harming those who suffer it; II) One who does injustice to others thereby does it to oneself. Then I discuss the two most plausible interpretations of II): a) One who does "conventional" injustice to others, i.e. causes them non-moral harm, thereby does "moralistic" injustice to oneself, i.e. makes oneself morally
more » ... eself morally worse; b) One who does "moralistic" injustice to others thereby does it to oneself. I show that a) is untenable because the Stoics reject the very notion of non-moral harm, and b) fails because they believe that moral harm is basically self-regarding.
doi:10.25205/1995-4328-2020-14-2-448-455 fatcat:omt64kx6qjbixbikd2a3aza4wa