A Unified Framework for Small Secret Exponent Attack on RSA
IEICE Transactions on Fundamentals of Electronics Communications and Computer Sciences
We address a lattice based method on small secret exponent attack on RSA scheme. Boneh and Durfee reduced the attack into finding small roots of a bivariate modular equation: x(N +1+y)+1 ≡ 0( mod e), where N is an RSA moduli and e is the RSA public key. Boneh and Durfee proposed a lattice based algorithm for solving the problem. When the secret exponent d is less than N 0.292 , their method breaks RSA scheme. Since the lattice used in the analysis is not full-rank, the analysis is not easy.
... is is not easy. Blömer and May gave an alternative algorithm. Although their bound d ≤ N 0.290 is worse than Boneh-Durfee result, their method used a full rank lattice. However, the proof for their bound is still complicated. Herrmann and May gave an elementary proof for the Boneh-Durfee's bound: d ≤ N 0.292 . In this paper, we first give an elementary proof for achieving the bound of Blömer-May: d ≤ N 0.290 . Our proof employs unravelled linearization technique introduced by Herrmann and May and is rather simpler than Blömer-May's proof. Then, we provide a unified framework to construct a lattice that are used for solving the problem, which includes two previous method: Herrmann-May and Blömer-May methods as a special case. Furthermore, we prove that the bound of Boneh-Durfee: d ≤ N 0.292 is still optimal in our unified framework.