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Strict Virtual Call Integrity Checking for C++ Binaries
2017
Proceedings of the 2017 ACM on Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security - ASIA CCS '17
Modern operating systems are equipped with defenses that render legacy code injection attacks inoperable. However, attackers can bypass these defenses by crafting attacks that reuse existing code in a program's memory. One of the most common classes of attacks manipulates memory data used indirectly to execute code, such as function pointers. This is especially prevalent in C ++ programs, since tables of function pointers (vtables) are used by all major compilers to support polymorphism. In
doi:10.1145/3052973.3052976
dblp:conf/ccs/ElsabaghFS17
fatcat:wqfuadxqhbbmpfcuuhrd34wrwy