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Distributed systems without a central authority, such as peer-topeer (P2P) systems, employ incentives to encourage nodes to follow the prescribed protocol. Game-theoretic analysis is often used to evaluate incentives in such systems. However, most gametheoretic analyses of distributed systems do not adequately model the repeated interactions of nodes inherent in such systems. We present a game-theoretic analysis of a popular P2P protocol, Bit-Torrent, that models the repeated interactions indoi:10.1145/2018436.2018458 dblp:conf/sigcomm/RahmanVHPS11 fatcat:sgpnfpxpfnbxnovrqhw2d2csce