1920 Mind  
From the Old Realism to the New.' [The most impressive type of reality in the animated or conscious external object, and the concepts of mental existence have always been modelled on this prototype. Thought has therefore moved first away from the primary model, defining mental existence by unlikeness to it (Verworn, Freud), though still moulding the mental in the likeness of the external world (the subconscious) ; and then baok again toward the model (Ward, Alexander, Pringle Pattison, the New
more » ... ealists), though with like intermediation (Pater's general consciousness).] R. A. Tsanoff. 'The Destiny of the Self in Prof. Bosanquet's Theory.' [Bosanquet's critics warn against a possible misapplication of his theory. If we are not to forget the abstraction involved in attending to the ' subordinate individual' par excellent*, we must also remember the corresponding abstraction involved in attending to the Absolute par excellence. The theory as a whole would have been better with more Bosanijuet and less Bradley.] Discussion. J. Lindsay. 'The Nature of Knowledge.' [Critique of Stout. Current philosophy suffers from the tendency to biologise perception and intelligence, and to treat perception as natural event rather than as perception of natural event.] Reviews of Books. Notices of New Books. Summaries of Articles. JOURMAL OP PHILOSOPHY, PSYCHOLOGY, AVD SCIENTIFIC METHODS. xvi., 21. L, L. Thurstoae. ' The Anticipatory Aspect of Consciousness.' [It is usual " to refer the anticipatory aspect of consciousness to the conative categories," but if we start from the reflex arc and "consider consciousness as in its essenoe a process of selecting an adaptive response," we find that "every intelligent response constitutes the conclusion of an act in which an earlier incomplete and unpsrticularised stage was conscious," and " may define intelligence as the remoteness from the overt act at which the reflex circuit becomes conscious," and finally arrive at the conclusion that "every psychosis actually is an unfinished act in the process of being defined into an overt response".] H. T. Costello. 'Relations between Relations.' [It is vain to call relations 'internal' because " internality to a thing can have no meaning whatever until you first define your 'thing'". The new realists instead of trying to prove that relations were 'external,' "fhould have Bwept aside the whole question with the single comment that ' thinghood' is a vague popular concept".] H. T. Moore. 'A reply to "The Defect of Current Democracy".' [Cf. xvi., 14. History is appealed to to show that democracy in in fact lesx repressive of originality than aristocracy.] H. B. Alexander. 'The New State.' [A review of Miss M. P. Follett's book with this title.] xvi., 22. M. T. McClure. ' Liberty and Keform.' [Subjectivism drifts towards anarchy, institutionalism toward tyranny. But subjectivism Always fails, as is proved by the Sophists, the Stoics, Koust>eau, the French humanitarians, and the Russian Bolsheviks. In the (improbable) event of his reading this, Lenin would doubtless smile.] J. B. Pratt. 'Realism and Perception.' ["Perception is the great stronghold of realism," but neither naive realism, nor Lockian dualism, nor neo-realism. can give a tenable account of it. There is always either failure to account for illusion or for true perception, or for both, as in 'new realism,' which comes to grief over both Scylla and Charybdis. The psychologists mostly endeavour to represent perception as exhausted by sensations and images and shrink from the ineaniiig
doi:10.1093/mind/xxix.3.375 fatcat:txtpb77zdjahlkbm4iwdflv43m