MIND ASSOCIATION

V. WELBY
1909 Mind  
MEND ASSOCIATION. THE annual meeting of the Mind Association will be held on Saturday 29th May at the University, Edmund St., Birmingham, at 430 P.M. This will be followed at 6*30 P.M. by a meeting of the Aristotelian Society, to which members of the Mind Association are invited and may bring friends. The papers on the subject-Why Htiralitm f (by Messrs. J. H. Muirhead, F. 0. 8. Schiller and A. E. Taylor) will be taken as read, and will be sent to members of the Association, and also to their
more » ... and also to their friends, on application to the Hon. Mr. H. W. Carr, Bury, Pulborough, Sussex. At 8 P.M. there will be a dinner for members of the two Societies in the University Club. Further particulars may be obtained from Prof. Muirhead, the University, Birmingham. The following gentlemen have joined the Mind Association since the printing of the January number:-Hanoyaide, J., 3 Hatton Place, Edinburgh. Hardie R. P., 13 Palmarston Road, Edinburgh. MR. McTAGGART ON THE " UNREALITY OF TIME ". As Mr. McTaggart apparently intends to return to the subject of the Unreality of Time, it would of course be premature to offer observations on his whole position. But there is a point of view from which his arguments are seen to be distorted from the outset by what we may perhaps call a flaw in the glass through which we habitually observe and consider the whole subject of ' time '. This was roughly indicated and outlined in my Article on Time as Derivative (MIND, vol. zvi, No. 63); though, as the subject still lacks adequate exposition and discussion, the position assumed could hardly expect to be definitely taken into account. From this position, however, the orientation of our idea of time is changed, its perspectives are altered, or more strictly, it comes under the category to which perspectives belong. If the sense-percept of Motion and therefore change in Space was not prior to the idea of tune and did not include, as having involved, it, our choice of terminology for its expression and definition would not be what it is. We should have an instinctive sense of incongruity, e.g., in speaking of a " series of positions running from the far post through the near past to the present, and then from the present to the near future and the far future (n.6., the question as to how a series of positions can ' run ' is a distinct one). As it is, we curiously ignore the obvious origin of the idea of ' put' from passed, ' present' from presented (here, ' in this place ') and ' future ' from ' yet to come,' to arrive. When we admit that time involves change, may we not rather suggest that change shares with Motion and its implied Space wherein to move, the parentage of time, as movement through the space of experience in an irreversible direction ? ' We may agree that " the relations of earlier and later are permanent". But why ? Because they are questions of position. A day, an hour, is a 1 The question of reversal seems as yet practically begged. There is at least one sense-that of reminiscence, recollection, record, rather than memory-in which time is already reversible.
doi:10.1093/mind/xviii.1.326 fatcat:6tmh2rhhkjfy5gwmd2cyeqrmmu